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Sitting	on	the	fence:	How	the	London	summit	exposed
the	inertia	in	the	EU’s	reconciliation	policy	for	the
Western	Balkans
The	2018	Western	Balkans	Summit	was	held	in	London	on	9-10	July.	As	Denisa	Kostovicova
explains,	there	was	hope	that	the	summit	might	officially	launch	a	regional	fact-finding	commission	–
RECOM	–	which	would	record	the	victims	of	human	rights	violations	to	help	aid	the	reconciliation
process	in	the	region.	However,	even	though	the	summit	put	legacy	issues	on	the	agenda,	it	dashed
hopes	for	RECOM	at	this	stage	at	least,	underlining	the	EU’s	lack	of	a	concrete	programme	for
addressing	the	crimes	of	the	past	and	advancing	reconciliation.
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Despite	Brexit,	and	the	paradox	of	a	departing	member	state	aspiring	to	steer	the	agenda	of	the	EU’s	engagement
with	the	Western	Balkans	through	the	German	initiative	called	the	Berlin	process,	last	week’s	London	Summit	on	the
Western	Balkans	held	out	much	hope.
This	was	especially	the	case	for	civil	society	–	NGOs	and	associations	–	representing	all	ethnic	groups	involved	in
the	wars	of	Yugoslavia’s	dissolution	who	are	gathered	around	an	initiative	advocating	the	establishment	of	a	state-
level	regional	fact-finding	commission,	RECOM.	They	hoped	that	a	declaration	signed	by	the	Balkan	states	(initially
by	Serbia,	Kosovo,	Montenegro	and	Macedonia,	to	be	followed	by	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina	as	well	as	Croatia)	at	the
London	Summit	would	initiate	the	formal	process	of	its	establishment.	This	did	not	come	to	pass.
Civil	society	activists	are	now	left	to	grapple	with	the	question	of	how	to	press	on	with	their	cause.	Their
disappointment	lays	bare	dilemmas	facing	not	just	the	Summit’s	host,	but	also	the	EU’s	policy	towards	the	legacy	of
war	crimes	in	the	Western	Balkans.	The	dilemma	is	stark	given	that	the	closure	of	the	Criminal	Tribunal	for	the
former	Yugoslavia	in	The	Hague	(ICTY)	at	the	end	of	last	year,	which	was	the	lynchpin	of	the	EU’s	policy	toward	the
criminal	legacy	in	the	region	and	reconciliation,	reveals	the	void	in	this	policy	area.
Why	RECOM?
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In	the	run-up	to	the	London	Summit,	the	supporters	of	the	RECOM	initiative	made	a	compelling	case.	Civil	society
activists	have	argued	for	RECOM	as	a	regional	fact-finding	commission	that	would	record	the	war	dead	and
survivors	of	gross	human	rights	violations	and	the	circumstances	of	their	death	and	of	their	suffering.	Although	the
facts	of	war	crimes	will	always	lend	themselves	to	different	interpretations	in	divided	post-conflict	settings,
establishing	the	facts	of	war	crimes	in	the	first	instance	would	prevent	the	political	manipulation	of	the	numbers	of
victims	and	advance	reconciliation	efforts.
A	restorative	approach	to	justice-seeking	through	victims’	testimonies	as	opposed	to	through	war	crimes	trials	would
also	be	conducive	to	nourishing	empathy	towards	the	victims	belonging	to	another	ethnic	group.	All	ethnic	groups	in
the	Balkans	understand	victimhood	exclusively	from	their	narrow	ethnic	perspective.	Reconciliation	requires
recognition	of	the	pain	and	suffering	of	others.
Facing	criticism	that	a	regional	approach	to	transitional	justice	may	trump	or	even	marginalise	national-level
initiatives,	the	response	by	RECOM’s	advocates	was	clear	in	that	regional	and	national	initiatives	are	not
incompatible.	Lastly,	many	civil	society	organisations	have	already	begun	to	register	war	dead,	demonstrating	the
importance	of	fine-grained	factual	accounts	of	those	bloody	war	years.	Not	only	does	the	registration	of	victims	by
name	and	last	name	alongside	the	circumstances	of	their	suffering	give	them	recognition,	the	pattern	of	killings	also
reveals	new	knowledge	about	the	nature	and	conduct	of	war.
But,	these	civil	society	projects	lack	the	legitimacy	that	they	would	acquire	if	they	were	carried	out	officially	and
regionally	following	an	inter-state	agreement	and	the	states’	commitment	to	the	process;	hence,	the	hopes	for	the
London	Summit	and	the	beginning	of	the	state-led	fact-finding	process	in	the	Balkans.
Why	not	RECOM?
If	the	case	for	the	establishment	of	RECOM	is	so	compelling,	why	didn’t	the	official	launch	of	the	regional	fact-finding
process	take	place	at	the	London	Summit?	The	inability	of	RECOM’s	activists	to	win	over	the	governments	in	the
region	to	support	the	fact-finding	exercise	–	conceivably,	an	apolitical	exercise	–	is	ultimately	a	matter	of	politics.	Any
move	in	the	direction	of	reconciliation,	however	modest,	is	the	biggest	threat	to	elites	in	the	Balkans.	Reconciliation
undermines	the	credibility	of	nationalist	rhetoric	that	has	proved	handy	in	diverting	attention	away	from	poor
governance,	including	corruption.
Montenegro’s	commitment	to	RECOM	on	the	eve	of	the	London	Summit	shows	that	this	needn’t	be	so.	In	fact,
reckoning	with	the	criminal	past	is	integral	to	progress	in	democratisation	and	good	governance.	But	the	expectation
that	RECOM’s	activists	can	deliver	the	deal,	securing	the	endorsement	of	governments	which	will	then	be	rubber-
stamped	either	at	some	EU-related	summit	or	by	the	EU	itself,	overestimates	the	impact	of	civil	society	on	policy-
making	in	the	Balkan	context	and	underestimates	the	resistance	of	Balkan	governments	to	accountability	for	war
crimes	(including	the	resistance	of	Croatia,	an	EU	member	state).
Furthermore,	this	situation	can	be	read	as	the	unwillingness	of	EU	member	states	to	call	out	Balkan	governments	on
their	reluctance,	at	best,	and	obstruction,	at	worst,	in	relation	to	dealing	with	the	past.	Above	all,	the	outcome	of	the
London	Summit	points	to	the	importance	of	the	EU’s	own	role	in	supporting	efforts	to	overcome	the	criminal	legacy	in
the	Balkans.	The	EU’s	war	crimes	conditionality	policy,	which	required	cooperation	with	the	ICTY	as	a	condition	for
the	countries’	progress	in	the	process	of	European	integration,	was	vehemently	contested.	Its	effectiveness	is	subject
to	ongoing	discussion	and	appraisal.	But,	without	doubt,	it	provided	a	focal	point	for	the	debate	about	justice	and
responsibility.
Without	it,	it	is	all	too	evident	that	it	is	easy	to	sweep	issues	relating	to	justice	and	responsibility	under	the	carpet.	The
evidence	from	flawed	domestic	war	crimes	prosecutions	is	ample.	Tolerance	of	abusive	nationalist	rhetoric	along
with	denigration	and	insults	of	victims	of	war	crimes	in	public	discourse	is	telling.	The	post	ICTY-situation	reveals	the
necessity	of	some	form	of	external	steering	and	involvement	to	strengthen	the	local	champions	of	truth,
accountability	and	justice.
Stepping	into	the	void
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With	its	focus	on	legacy	issues,	the	London	Summit	on	the	Western	Balkans	stepped	into	the	void	after	the	closure
of	the	Hague	Tribunal.	The	signed	statements	on	legacy	issues	are	a	contribution	to	mainstreaming	issues	related	to
war	crimes	and	human	rights	violations,	and	aim	to	secure	the	commitment	of	Balkan	states	to	working	on	their
resolution.
The	summit	highlighted	the	important	issue	of	those	missing	from	the	wars;	it	did	not	let	the	responsibility	for	sexual
war-time	violence	and	combating	the	stigma	surrounding	the	victims	of	sexual	violence	slip	off	the	agenda,	and	it
recognised	the	significance	of	the	regional	approach	and	cooperation	for	addressing	the	outstanding	legacy	issues.
In	a	moment	of	frankness,	on	the	margins	of	the	summit,	an	official	from	the	Balkans	told	me	of	his	genuine
uncertainty	about	which	way	is	the	right	way	to	go	about	reconciliation:	to	leave	the	past	behind	and	move	on,	or	to
dig	deep	into	the	pain	and	wounds	for	the	sake	of	reconciliation.	The	EU’s	policy,	which	is	not	unequivocally	invested
beyond	rhetoric,	and	lacks	a	concrete	programme	of	action	and	evaluation	of	progress	in	addressing	the	crimes	of
the	past	and	advancing	reconciliation,	comes	across	as	sitting	on	the	fence,	too.
Such	a	policy	is	also	a	signal	for	local	elites	that	signatures	do	not	mean	much,	as	neither	individual	EU	member
states	nor	the	EU	as	a	whole,	let	alone	local	civil	groups,	will	or	can	hold	them	to	account.	That	a	deep	sense	of
injustice	may	fester	and	hurt,	with	implications	beyond	the	Balkans,	is	not	of	their	concern	either.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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